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Abstract This paper outlines and explores a key obstacle to evaluating edu-
cation policy using the capability approach. According to the capability
approach, education policy should be targeted towards expanding people’s
capabilities. Values are central to an individual’s capability set, because they
determine the functionings important to them, and therefore the capabilities
which are valuable to that individual. However, it is argued here that edu-
cation has a more complex function than other areas of social policy, as edu-
cation is able to influence and transfer values much more directly. How do we
examine the relationship between education and the expansion of an individ-
ual’s capabilities, if at the same time the process of education may directly
determine the very nature of the capability set itself? As a solution, a form
of education is proposed that would enable students to become aware of
the values they hold, and develop them further through fostering critical
thinking, practical reason, and access to knowledge, rather than directly
imparting values to students. We illustrate this drawing on a recent project
on higher education and transformation in South Africa.
Key words: Capabilities, Education policy, Values formation, Pedagogy
Introduction
Recent theorizing on capabilities in relation to education has led to the clarifi-
cation of a number of points, including: the role of education in human flourish-
ing; how formal education can diminish capabilities; and the distinction
between capability to participate in education and capabilities gained
through education (Walker and Unterhalter, 2007; Vaughan, 2007; Terzi,
2008). This paper turns to an issue that has not yet been adequately addressed
in the literature: the problem of reconciling the pivotal role of values in an indi-
vidual’s capability set, with the fact that all education is inherently value-laden
and values forming. In doing so, it engages with recent work by some scholars
who have called for a greater attention to how values are formed, and for further
analysis of the dynamics of value formation behind the ‘capabilities people have
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reason to value’ (Deneulin, 2011; Burchardt, 2009). In this article, we proble-
matize the relationship between education and capability (‘what we have
reason to value’) expansion, and argue that this is a particularly pertinent
problem for capability theorists working in the domain of education policy.
This paper is particularly concerned with public education policy and a
formal education system’s cultural structures; that is, arrangements such as
resourcing, teacher education, curriculum (what and whose knowledge
counts), pedagogy, and ethical ideas about what it means to become and be
human, informing what counts as worthwhile education and educational prac-
tices. Such structures are fundamentally influenced by government policy and
public culture. The process of education policy formation is one involving
values, histories and contexts (Rizvi and Lingard, 2010). Values, public policy
formation, policy choices, and policy implementation are inextricably interwo-
ven. Education, moreover is, we point out, inescapably normative in that it
seeks to change people for the better, developing powers of reasoning, critical-
ity, imagination and reflection to form judgements about activities and lives that
are worthwhile, among alternatives (Peters, 1966; Katz, 2010; Nussbaum,
2006a). As R. S. Peters (1966) explains, it would not be logical to say something
like ‘my child has been educated but is in no way changed for the better’. Edu-
cation takes a view on what is worthwhile and sets out deliberately to influence
lives, not only now but also towards possible futures.
Thus, this paper proposes that there is a key obstacle to evaluating the
contribution of education to capability expansion—the central role of
values in determining and shaping an individual’s capability set in the first
place. As we argue in this paper, this is a significant issue for educationalists
as this is a policy area that potentially directly shapes agency goals more
than other areas of public policy such as welfare and health; it therefore
merits investigation. ‘Values’, argues Deneulin (2011, p. 130), ‘are what
allow people to prioritise capabilities’. Furthermore it is in the policy arena
that we define and represent what the ‘problem’ is taken to be (Bacchi,
2009). For us as authors, part of the problem of education is way in which
values (‘what we have reason to value’) shapes the capability set (reflecting
which functionings are valuable, particularly those relating to agency)
rather than only operating at the point of reasoned choosing or the exercise
of judgment about how to use a capability, as Saito (2003) suggests. We
propose a possible solution by conceptualizing education as an active space
that may enable an individual to learn and to develop their values and
agency goals, rather than something that only transmits or reproduces particu-
lar values (i.e. as if values are not understood to have any relationship to the
nature or shape of a capability set). If values were only a matter of trans-
mission in education it would be possible to inculcate identical values and
produce identical capability sets, but we know that this is not the case and
that education is rather more complex.
Moreover we address the further crucial question of defining what might
be considered ‘worthwhile’ values and the potential of education to advance
human development. This is illustrated with an example from higher
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education, although equally an example from gender and education or early
childhood education, and so on, could have been chosen; we happen to
have both worked on this project together and feel it captures our point
well. We therefore refer to this research project on higher education in
South Africa, which investigated the potential of various degree courses to
produce professionals with ‘pro-poor’ values who might, after university, go
on to work for social justice and transformation in wider society. We under-
stand values in education to be significant in shaping and influencing behav-
iour and actions; that values can be promoted through meaningful educational
activities; and that the educational opportunities provided in schools and
colleges ought to foster behaviours and values which advance human develop-
ment and well-being, both for individuals and society.
We further recognize that the aims of education which policy seeks to
articulate may be universally indeterminate (Peters, 1966), requiring public
reasoning about ‘the common good’ (Deneulin and Townsend, 2007),
including the device of Smith’s ‘impartial spectator’ (see Sen, 2009) so that
policy aims are debated both from the perspective of ‘distant strangers’
and our own subject positions, as well as by all those involved in making
the policy. In this way, agreed educational values ought to emerge as those
that promote flourishing and well-being for all, not just some. Here we
make the further point that communities might choose educational values
that are not to the benefit of all (e.g. girls), so either there needs to be
some core of universal values arising from the goal of ‘human development’,
and/or a process that subjects a particular community’s or society reasoning
about education to impartial scrutiny as noted above. In our case study, the
valuation process is thus not open-ended; we do not take education as a
space for the formation of any old values, but rather values consistent
with the capability approach’s concern with well-being freedoms and
achievements, and the values implicit in Sen’s (2009) emphasis on processes
of public reasoning. We believe that shared aims (and hence values) might
include social justice, equality of opportunity, and respect for each other
(Katz, 2010). In this paper we do not go into detail on which are worthwhile
values for education, nor do we detail the debates about communities and
value formation, and the limits and possibilities of reasoning and structures
of inequality.
This paper now proceeds by discussing the significance of different areas
of public policy for an individual’s capability set, with particular reference to
the formation of individual values. In the following section, we discuss the
close relationship between education and values. Next, we move on to proble-
matize the role of education within the capability approach, specifically in
terms of its propensity for forming values and thereby determining the very
nature of individual capability sets. Last, we propose a solution to this conun-
drum through the conceptualization of an educational process that facilitates
rather than dictates the development of individual values, drawing on the
example of a research project on the development of ‘pro-poor professionals’
in South Africa.
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The role of public policy in expanding capabilities
According to the capability approach, the informational space for measuring
equality should be an individual’s capability set, rather than levels of resources
or levels of happiness. Sen defines capability as ‘a person’s ability to do valu-
able acts or reach valuable states of being; [it] represents the alternative com-
binations of things a person is able to do or be’ (1993, p. 30). The concept of
capabilities thus encapsulates the freedoms people have to do and be what
they value being and doing; for example, taking part in discussions, thinking
critically about society, being knowledgeable, having good friendships, being
treated with respect, and so on. Having capability enables people to choose
functionings that they value for a good life. From this perspective, therefore,
public policies should aim to expand individual capability sets.
Thinking about public policy in general, if we consider the personal and
social context of an individual’s capability set as laid out by Robeyns (2005),
government interventions can have implications for different sections of this
set, chiefly:
1. goods and services available to individuals (e.g. hospitals, schools, child-
care, transport, mental health support); and
2. the social context in which individuals operate (e.g. media images about
working mothers, the acceptability of working mothers given legitimacy
by supportive government schemes, legal rights for working mothers,
women as scientists and engineers).
Policies may indirectly and more or less deliberately influence social con-
texts and public ethos. Examples of government initiatives that might directly
aim to influence the social context could include an Equalities Commission to
monitor and report on fairness, a health intervention to discourage smoking,
or laws on women’s rights. Measures such as taxation may also indirectly be
effective in changing public values by first changing behaviours. For
example, with regard to the environment, price mechanisms and other incen-
tive systems (such as the presence of recycling facilities) may have an effect.
Although it is also important to remember that social policy by definition
emerges from and is shaped by the social context.
For most public policy sectors, however, we argue that the most direct
influence is on the amount of goods and services available to individuals (‘A’
in Figure 1), through varying levels of direct investment by government.
Examples might be the provision of affordable and regular public transport;
modern, well-equipped hospitals and free healthcare; and free, good quality
schooling. Because the area public policy most affects is goods and services,
public policy can serve to widen or narrow the range of functionings that an
individual can choose between. However, as a general rule, it does not deter-
mine which functionings are valuable to the individual (i.e. the agency goals,
and therefore the overall ‘shape’ or ‘scope’ of the capability set itself). For
example, free bus passes for pensioners is a goods and services provision
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that would expand their mobility capability and functioning, without necess-
arily being concerned with how much mobility, mobility for what, or the
valuing of mobility. A second example might be the NHS in the UK, which
offers goods and services but does not set out directly to form agency goals
(and hence values).
Education policy is another example: an education system provides
goods and services that an individual can ideally convert, expanding their
capability to be formally educated. However, in contrast to other areas of
public policy, education also has the potential to directly influence the for-
mation of an individual’s agency goals. In the following section, we argue
that education policy needs to be considered differently to other areas of
public policy, and presents a particular conundrum to capability theorists,
because of its distinctive role in value formation.
Education and values1
As summarized at the start of the previous section, values are central to an
individual’s capability set because they influence and determine agency
goals: they establish which functionings are important to people, and there-
fore the capabilities which are valuable to that individual. In this way,
values logically determine the shape and scope of the capability set and are
included in the space of choosing.
FIGURE 1. Different roles of education in Robeyns’ stylized non-dynamic representation of a person’s
capability set and her social and personal context.
Source: Robeyns (2005, p. 98).
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So far, research has explored how education is central to the develop-
ment of capabilities, because it provides people with skills and capacities:
reading and writing, numeracy, self-confidence and empowerment. Because
education is crucial for well-being, education should be directed towards
expanding people’s capabilities. This can be understood both in terms of
capabilities to access education (e.g. is there safe public transport to the
nearest school; is schooling affordable for all; can anyone aspire to go to uni-
versity), and also in the capabilities that persons gain through education (e.g.
literacy, self-confidence, imagination, economic skills; see Vaughan, 2007).
Studies have also shown how, in practice, formal education structures
can have both positive and negative effects on capabilities; for example,
gender violence in schools (Unterhalter, 2003; Walker, 2006). However, the
kind of education that forms capabilities is, for Sen (see Dre`ze and Sen,
1995), rich and ‘thick’; it has multi-dimensional instrumental and intrinsic
value, and transformative potential. Having education is a valuable achieve-
ment for a young person in itself for effective non-economic freedoms;
access to education broadens one’s horizons, brings one into touch with
diverse others; and education helps instrumentally to do many other things
that are also valuable, such as getting a job. Education is also valuable for its
social contributions; it facilitates public discussion and informed collective
demands; it has interpersonal effects in opening up opportunities for
others, and it contributes to public and democratic life. From a social perspec-
tive, education can have empowerment and distributive effects; disadvan-
taged groups can increase their ability to resist inequalities and get a fairer
deal in and through education. Crucially, having education affects the develop-
ment and expansion of other capabilities so that an education capability
expands other human freedoms. We use the notion of ‘education’ in this
expansive way in the paper (and see Peters, 1966).
The significance of education for capabilities has therefore principally
been conceptualized in terms of enhancing individual conversion factors
(‘B’ in Figure 1)—a basic example being how literacy enables an individual
to convert the resource of a newspaper into information and knowledge
(and reasoning would enable an individual to read it critically); or how under-
standing legal rights would enable a woman suffering from domestic violence
to obtain a divorce. Through developing reasoning skills, education also influ-
ences how individuals make good or better choices towards particular func-
tionings (‘C’ in Figure 1).
Another integral characteristic of educational systems and processes,
however, is that they may also explicitly or implicitly embody values, deter-
mined by government policy. It is not difficult to think of examples of states
using their education system to explicitly transfer particular values: national
allegiance, racial prejudice, religion.2 States have frequently produced
history curricula in schools to support certain agendas; for example, the
Indian government promoting a nationalist agenda (Sen, 2005, pp. 62–69).
Education has also been harnessed by more liberal and left-wing agendas;
for example, several initiatives have promoted particular forms of education
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for peace, education for human rights, and education for citizenship. ‘Devel-
opment Education’ in the UK aims to promote values of global social justice
(Bourn, 2008); another example is ‘Teaching Democratic Values’, a recent
initiative of the Australian government, which focuses on democratic values
and principals such as freedom, responsibility, justice, honesty, respect for
the land, leadership qualities, personal values and qualities, and tolerance,
inclusion and diversity.3
In these examples, we find a pro-active stance on imbuing formal edu-
cation with producing particular values; in most cases, backed up by powerful
political groups with particular agendas. In other instances, values may be less
consciously embedded in curricula, but be present nonetheless. McLaughlin
(2003) argues that it is impossible for education to be value-free:
The value-laden character of the activities of teaching and schooling
(and more broadly of education) is not merely a matter of practical
inescapability. It is also one of logic. A value-free education is not
merely a practical impossibility but also a contradiction in terms.
The very idea of education involves value. (McLaughlin, 2003, p. 138)
The issue is that education is never a value-free or neutral project and
cannot be conceptualized as such because to do so would be ‘vapid and point-
less’ (Brighouse and Swift, 2003, p. 367). Education is unavoidably normative
because it always takes a position on what ought to be worthwhile beha-
viours, attitudes, activities, and so on, in guiding our individual conduct and
choices. The point is that the content and knowledge base of education is
important, rather than the mere functioning of attending school. Pedagogy,
too, also transmits values through the forms, ethics and practices of teaching.4
This is important from a human development perspective, because we
can identify certain values as likely to enhance the capabilities of society
overall: such pro-poor values would involve education for human develop-
ment, democratic cooperation, and respect. Thomas Pogge (2010), amongst
others, has recently argued that those living in higher-income countries
have a duty and a responsibility to act in the interests of those in developing
economies; it would then follow that education would have a part to play in
teaching about and learning such commitments.
Education is therefore a complex area of public policy because, as well as
imparting skills and specific capacities, it also has the potential to have a signifi-
cant impact on what is valuable to an individual and therefore what goals (par-
ticularly agency goals) and other-regarding commitments they might form.
Education policy and the capability set: expansion, contraction
or definition?
Now we turn to look at the implications of the relationship between edu-
cation policy and values from a capability perspective. If we relate this to
the model of an individual’s capability set, education has a more complex
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function than other areas of social policy: in addition to the provision of goods
and services, education is able to influence, transfer and transform values
much more explicitly and directly than other areas of government policy. If
we are concerned with the expansion of individual capability sets, education
policy therefore occupies a rather unique position compared with other areas
of public policy.
As stated above, values are central to an individual’s capability set,
because they determine the functionings important to them (the focus
should be, as Sen reminds us, on the outcomes and processes which people
have reason to value). Yet as Deneulin (2011) notes, little has so far been
written in the field of human development about the formation and social con-
struction of values. But the question of how individuals come to value various
ways of being and doing is a very important one. As explored by Burchardt
(2009), simply evaluating inequality or disadvantage through already-formed
agency goal achievement is problematic, because agency goals can be
shaped in restricted circumstances—for example, in a situation of deprivation,
conditioned expectations are a problem and adaptive preference can deter-
mine values and restrict agency goals. Burchardt suggests one option is that
we focus our efforts not on agency freedom but agency goal freedom—the
freedom to form agency goals, ‘a kind of meta-freedom not captured by the
concept of agency freedom itself’ (2009, p. 8). In her view, both the agency
goals and the capability set within which such goals are pursued should be
evaluated. What we have reason to value may be severely constrained when
genuine options are literally unthinkable (e.g. women leading an autonomous
life in some societies) or, even if thinkable, seem unattainable (e.g. going
against a family expectation of choosing marriage over a career). To bring
agency goals forward into the frame of our evaluation means, in turn, to
attend to the values that influence and form agency goals (e.g. schooling
that educates citizens for the common good rather than educating them to
be consumers of a private good, to earn more in the marketplace), and
hence influence and form a capability set (e.g. a capability set that would
enable a young person to choose a career as an inner-city doctor).
Adopting the same line, we argue here that education policy therefore
provides a rather unique conundrum from a capability perspective. According
to the normative aspect of the capability approach, policy reform should be
guided by a concern to expand individual capability sets. The preferences
that then influence an individual’s choice of functioning will have been influ-
enced and formed by social context, personal psychology and history, all of
which will have been indirectly influenced by government reforms or
actions of the state. Formal education, however, is likely to have directly influ-
enced the formation of individual preference and values (or had considerably
more direct influence on those values than other areas of public policy).
The problem from a capability perspective, therefore, is how do we
examine the relationship between education and the expansion of an individ-
ual’s capabilities, if at the same time the process of education may directly
determine the very nature (the values base) of the capability set itself? For
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example, formal education may give someone advanced literacy, numeracy
and logical skills so that they can perform the valuable function of becoming
a lawyer, but the desire to become a lawyer, and indeed what kind of lawyer
(e.g. corporate or human rights), may have been highly influenced by the cur-
ricula, pedagogy and ethos at school.5
As outlined in the section above, schools may explicitly aim to encourage
certain values and goals (educational and otherwise) in their students. But
schools also have the ability to raise awareness by exposing students to a
wider variety of inputs. As Burchardt (2009, p. 7) observes: ‘if I have never
seen or heard a piano, I am unlikely to form the goal of becoming a concert
pianist’. This has implications from a human development perspective: if I
have never had the opportunity to act ethically, I may not learn this way of
being (Sandel, 2010). One particularly significant area of awareness-raising is
exposing students to the realities of society. For example, if young people
are vaguely aware of the existence of poverty, but are unaware of the true
proportions, reasons for its existence, or means through which it can be
addressed, they are unlikely to either realize their inner values if they relate
to this, or develop agency goals relating to poverty reduction. We might
argue that those who have advantages need to learn what it means to be
part of a just society and what the implications are for treating people with
respect and dignity as full human beings whose presence matters, and to
learn through their education to be capable of treating others with
respect. For example, Yates and McLeod (2000), based on their research in
Australia, argue that schools can make a difference as to how the advantaged
perceive the disadvantaged. They point out that when middle-class students
come to see themselves as capable and responsible agents it feeds into how
these young people see others who may be less capable, so that there is a
lack of sympathy for those who are disadvantaged. On the other hand they
found schools where students had been sensitized more effectively to social
justice. The assumption is that education does not necessarily legitimize the
interests of the powerful in society and can instil altruistic values and
outcomes.
So far, receiving education has usually been positioned as beneficial to an
individual’s capabilities (for example, Sen and Dreze, 2002), or detrimental
(mis-educative) if attending school has a negative impact on other capabilities
(e.g. increasing the risk of HIV/AIDS infection for schoolgirls in South Africa;
see Unterhalter, 2003). However, an individual’s capability set itself and its
effect for their agency goal formation may also be determined by the edu-
cation they receive. If education affects what you value, it affects your
agency goals and therefore the nature or ‘shape’ of your capability set.
Education to realize valuable goals: are South African
universities producing ‘pro-poor’ professionals?
There is an important implication of this for capability research. If education is
likely to determine the very nature of the capability set in the first place, it
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therefore may be deeply problematic to think about education reform simply
with the goal of expanding individual capabilities. If a school, for example,
imbues students with a strong sense of national identity and loyalty, then stu-
dents may be more likely to be guided by nationalist sentiments when forming
their agency goals in life. If a school exposes students to the idea that women
can be political leaders, then more girls may form the agency goal of being pol-
itically active. Beyond the fact that formal education can expand core or basic
capabilities, such as well-being and agency that comes from reading and
writing, legal literacy (Nussbaum, 2000; Walker et al., 2009), and so on,
how do we negotiate evaluating capabilities that stem from formal education,
given the complexity of agency goal formation?
As discussed above, whether it is possible or even desirable in practice to
impart such a ‘value-free’ education is highly questionable. As Burchardt
(2009, p. 15) observes, all individuals are subjected to influences and it
would be problematic to define them as incompatible with real freedom;
the question is, what types of influence or conditioning are compatible
with real freedoms?6 In this final section, it is argued that it is possible (and
necessary for genuinely autonomous capability expansion) to have an edu-
cation that aims to enable young people to realize and develop their own sig-
nificant values, while also opening up knowledge and dialogue about which
values are worthwhile and deserve priority.
This argument is illustrated using data from a recent Economic and Social
Research Council (ESRC) project on higher education in South Africa, which
explored the role of professional education in the development of social
justice values among students (Walker et al., 2009; Walker, in press).
The project in South Africa was a study of professional education sites in
the fields of Law, Social Work, Public Health, Engineering and Theology, and
the extent to which these courses enabled university students to develop
the skills and capacities to reduce poverty in their future working lives; to
what extent the courses enabled them to become ‘pro-poor professionals’.7
Despite the end of apartheid over 15 years ago, levels of poverty and inequal-
ity in South Africa have regrettably increased, and the work of professionals is
crucial to South Africa’s future—for example, whether engineers work solely
on private projects, or work to improve conditions in the townships; or
whether lawyers work for private or corporate law, or help to increase the
legal capabilities of those in low-income communities. Although the study
was conducted at the level of professional education, the implications apply
to all levels of formal education. Drawing on interviews with diverse individ-
uals and groups, a ‘public-good professional capabilities index’ was developed
as a tool to evaluate the extent to which courses helped to develop valued
capabilities amongst the students (Walker et al., 2019; Walker, in press).
First of all, the findings provided examples of how education can either
bypass entirely the issue of poverty awareness and engagement, or actively
enable students to value and choose pro-poor professional work. Second,
the project involved an exploration of how such pro-poor ambitions might
be fostered. Given that individuals differ in their biographies, we can envision
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that some students would inherently value the reduction of poverty in their
country.8 Rather than explicitly instructing or overtly influencing students
to adopt pro-poor values, we can see that some elements of courses facilitated
students in clarifying their existing feelings and values about poverty; and,
where these resonated with the goal of poverty reduction, crucially equipped
them to realize this in their professional lives.
The research findings showed that professional courses could enable
some students to develop into ‘pro-poor professionals’ through the following:
1. Awareness-raising through exposure to the realities of poverty in South
Africa. Many students spoke of how their course had raised their awareness
of poverty by exposing them to things they otherwise would never have
seen. Rather than the courses explicitly instructing the students that
they had a duty to work for poorer communities, critical knowledge, dialo-
gue and experiential learning opportunities exposed them to the stark rea-
lities of poverty in South Africa. The end result was that some of the
students realized that it was important to them to incorporate this in
their work—which could suggest that it resonated with existing feelings,
helping students to recognize and develop a significant internal value;
and at the same time developing the student’s capability to work
towards that value (reducing poverty).
2. The development of critical reasoning, giving students the ability and
opportunity to explore their own underlying values, in this example in
the context of an awareness of levels of poverty in South Africa. Rather
than an emphasis on education imparting or requiring particular values
uncritically, this throws emphasis on the ability of education to foster
rational thought and critical thinking and discussion, and allows for
reasoned pluralism consistent with the capability approach. Deneulin
(2011, pp. 131–132) explains that, while the capability approach empha-
sizes the importance of values, what it actually places stress on is not
values per se but the act of valuing, which is closely associated with reason-
ing. Individuals can use reasoning to identify and clarify what is valuable to
them; values, however, also determine to some extent the reasoning
process.9
3. Imparting certain skills and capacities (resilience, relevant professional
knowledge, understanding of collective effort and struggle), so that
those who chose a ‘pro-poor’ professional path would be better equipped
with the tools to do so.
A foundational part of this paper’s argument is that, underlying various
external influences, individuals will all have different tendencies, interests
and values; the capability approach is designed to recognize and take into
account diversity in goals between individuals. Some students inherently
cared more about social justice than others, and these students gained the
most from the pro-poor elements of courses. Others who were exposed to
poverty through their courses may have expressed some passing interest or
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excitement, and then continued along a professional path not specifically con-
cerned with poverty reduction. Some others were shocked into an awareness
of their own privilege and wanted to contribute to meaningful change in their
future professional careers. At best, all students were exposed to knowledge
and debate about South African society and its inequalities, in some way per-
meating a kind of ‘membrane’ that works to insulate the privileged in the
society from knowledge of the lives of those living in conditions of poverty.
It is particularly important to note that the education being considered
here is one without an explicit aim of imparting particular values but
instead of exposure to the realities of poverty and offering the chance to
acquire skills to work towards reducing poverty, as well as such a disposition
being embodied or modelled by the lecturers’ commitments. It did require
enquiry and the collective scrutiny of evidence rather than transmission
approaches to pedagogy and a climate of open discussion between students
holding diverse points of view, as well as skilful teaching. In this way students
might potentially arrive at kind of Rawlsian ‘overlapping consensus’ about
worthwhile values, while not agreeing on everything. This is different to a
more explicitly value-laden curriculum that might actively seek to transmit
particular agency goals (e.g. which explicitly told students they had a duty
to work to reduce poverty; or, that there was only one career choice that of
public service employment; or, using a completely different example, that
their race was superior to others). The latter approach veers dangerously
close to ‘unreasoning’ professional functionaries who ‘obey orders’, and
away from the capability approach’s deep concern with collective public
reasoning and individual practical reasoning in making good choices for com-
munities and individuals.
Ultimately this involves conceptualizing, if at all possible, an individual
with unrestrained (but realistic) values and agency goals, and that educational
arrangements can foster individual development along these lines. This sort of
education can be seen less as determining (and hence reducing autonomy) the
nature of an individual’s capability set (by transmitting values) and more as
enhancing the ability of the individual autonomously to realize, understand,
recognize, articulate and act towards or follow their own formed (through
education), informed and reasoned values through deep discussion, sustained
engagement and critical scrutiny of a range of perspectives among fellow stu-
dents, client groups and knowledge resources.
Where other areas of public policy might not direct citizens towards a
particular choice regarding the good life, education has the potential to be
more or less directive; for example, not only in teaching good citizenship or
democratic values, but enabling people to practise various forms of social
engagement and processes that would enable individuals to explore new
ideas about social relations and their own values relating to wider society.
That is, in education we have the opportunity to practise what it means to
become and be democratic citizens; to practise the necessary behaviour in
order to acquire a democratic (or respectful, or compassionate, or critical,
etc.) disposition (Dewey, 2007; Sandel, 2010). We acquire practical wisdom
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about worthwhile ways to be and to act; we encounter different ways of being
and living so that we can autonomously choose what is good for us. But we
can also learn guides to action by learning about ways of living and being
that respect and enhance the capabilities of others; for example, that com-
passion is more worthwhile than cruelty; that respect is more worthwhile
than hate; that imagination is more worthwhile than obtuseness; that
honesty is more worthwhile than cheating and plagiarism and getting
higher marks; or that bodily health is more worthwhile than bodily abuse.
A further example of how this might work—that is, the kind of curricu-
lum and pedagogical arrangements that create the spaces in which worth-
while reasoned values can be formed though activities and experiences as
well as exposure to knowledge—is to go back to the Humanities Curriculum
Project in the UK in the late 1960s. This set out to explore enquiry-based
teaching—that is, pupils involved in discussion and using evidence under
the guidance of the teacher—of highly controversial issues with 14-year-old
to 16-year-old pupils; for example, US involvement (at that time) in the
Vietnam war or the Arab-Israeli conflict. Such controversies were seen to sit
at the nexus of principles and values and complex considerations of traditions
and values (Stenhouse, 1971). More recently we might have students discuss-
ing controversial public issues such as stem cell research or same-sex mar-
riages. The pedagogical intent is not consensus but rather robust yet
respectful discussion about disagreements, what Sandel (2010) calls a politics
of moral engagement. Such pedagogies foster respect for evidence and delib-
eration, and nurture mutual respect and tolerance so that students come to
understand themselves and each other better, to be able to explain their
views coherently and even change them where they do not stand up to scru-
tiny. We argue that this kind of pedagogy must surely enable ‘wise’ and critical
values formation.
An important contrast with other areas of public policy, therefore, is that
education can explicitly enable students to critically reflect on the values they
hold and the reasons for which they make certain decisions. However, it also
remains a reality that, particularly in the current economic climate, students
themselves may expect to be primarily taught skills to improve their individual
position in the job market, and in a more traditional pedagogical style.
Burchardt (2009, pp. 16–17) argues that to use capabilities effectively to
evaluate equality, we need explicitly to take into account also the conditions
in which agency goals (‘capability as autonomy’) are formed, ideally using
longitudinal data. If this type of education is provided, it would be more
likely to facilitate ‘capability as autonomy’. Thus a significant part of the con-
ditions for capability as autonomy, we would argue, would be educational
arrangements that foster human development values and public values so
that autonomous choice is also about what it is worthwhile to choose (from
a human development perspective, this would mean respect rather than bul-
lying; tolerance rather than racism) even though educational arrangements
can never (and never should) entirely control the choices that people will
make. Indeed we have many examples of apparently well-educated people
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who hold anti-public values. Nonetheless, education ought to work to foster
public values, we think, but not under conditions of ‘banking’ and trans-
mission or an insistence that only certain values count,10 or that such
values can only be acted on in one way, respecting both the pluralism of
the capability approach and the concern for well-being and agency.
Concluding comments
Education is a cultural and social process that brings people together in collec-
tives of schools, subject choices, friendship groups, and so on. While edu-
cation is not entirely unique in doing this, from a perspective of public
policy, it is a primary site for collective activity and therefore potentially the
collective transmission of values. People are educated collectively, even
while there may be some individual provision for special circumstances like
severe disability; and in schools and colleges we have the unique opportunity
to reason together about a good society and the common good. (Setting aside
that some subjects like the arts and humanities do this especially well, see
Nussbaum [2010]; or that not all education in schools and colleges is public
provision, although it is as much part of the social fabric). Sandel captures
the issues when he writes:
If a just society requires a strong sense of community, it must find a
way to cultivate in citizens . . . a dedication to the common good. It
can’t be indifferent to the attitudes and dispositions . . . that citizens
bring to public life. It must find a way to lean against purely priva-
tised notions of the good life, and cultivate civic virtue (2010,
pp. 263–264)
It therefore follows that we might require that private education pro-
vision, when it includes some element of public or state support as is the
case in the UK and Australia, ought also to be committed to public values
and the public good.11
The relationship between education, values and capabilities is complex.
The approach proposed in this paper is that rather than seeing education as
imposing or transferring a set of external values (which it may certainly do
in some contexts of indoctrination), it is possible to envisage that an education
can enable an individual to learn, realize and clarify what is valuable to them;
to form their own significant values. From a human development and capabili-
ties perspective, the ideal aim of education is to enable students to become
aware of and develop such values through exposure to the realities of wider
society alongside the development of critical thinking, practical reason, and
access to knowledge, rather than to directly impart values by telling students,
or to insist on one version of the ‘good’ professional, to take the project dis-
cussed above. If this occurs, then in theory we can argue that the capability set
would be expanded, rather than merely influenced or ‘shaped’, by education
policy.
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It remains questionable whether we can talk about individuals having
‘core’ values (which can nonetheless evolve and develop through education),
inherent to them and independent of external influences. In our case study, by
the age at which students enter professional training, some had already had
some exposure to the realities of poverty in South Africa. Overall, how and
to what extent values are formed is an area requiring further analysis.
It may potentially be dangerous to argue that, on the one hand, education
can be value-free or even less imbued with values, but can still enable individ-
uals to realize their own significant values, particularly if sufficient attention is
not paid to the rest of an individual’s social context and the possibility of adap-
tive preference. For example, it could be used to argue that a good quality
school education will enable girls to develop and enhance traditionally femi-
nine capacities.12 Perhaps a notion of ‘value-critical’ education might work
better.
There are also limits to what education can do, when up against socio-
economic status and past experience, either in terms of imparting values if
that is the explicit aim, or in terms of ‘education to realize core values’. Edu-
cation is embedded in society and articulates with other public services.
Indeed, Burchardt (2009) presents evidence of how young people’s aspira-
tions for future education and employment in the UK can, despite the
efforts of schools, remain restricted according to social class. For the individ-
uals in the 1970 British cohort study, she notes that ‘the adaptation of agency
goals is structural and systematic’; ‘the ability to formulate agency goals at all is
conditioned by pre-existing inequality’ (Burchardt, 2009, pp. 9 and 11; see
also Hart, 2012). Two particular contextual factors are important: a public
culture that values the space schools and colleges offer in bringing together
young people of diverse backgrounds and perspectives (universities may
have an especially important role in this respect); and the quality of teaching
is important in so far as teachers and lecturers have the potential to demon-
strate in practice what education at is its best could be. Moreover, as stated
earlier in the paper, other aspects of public policy may also have an influence
on values in a less direct way; for example, if a state is strongly promoting the
message that everyone has an equal right to healthcare by investing significant
amounts in a national healthcare system.
The macro-relationship also remains to be explored, in terms of the influ-
ence of group and community values on individual goals (e.g. how societies
values can be transmitted through formal education—see for example Deneu-
lin, 2011, p. 137). There are many influences on value formation other than
formal education, not least the media and popular culture and, at a macro
level, the arguably corrupting effect of the market on education systems
and the values and ways of being that are then foregrounded.
But as education is ostensibly able to expand capabilities, we need to
scrutinize this in particular, and the ideas outlined in this paper are proposed
as a way of addressing the issue of education policy from a capability perspec-
tive. The project described in this paper investigated the development of pro-
poor values, but this would also be the case for any number of other examples.
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Notes
1 The term ‘values’ in this paper is used to broadly refer to matters that are valuable to an
individual and determine agency goals, rather than a specific set of ethical values or behav-
iour; although values to foster human development are used in the South African example
in the final section of the paper.
2 To use a well-known example, the majority of American schools begin each morning with a
pledge of allegiance to the flag and the republic.
3 ‘Teaching Democratic Values’ is a unit of work for upper primary and lower secondary stu-
dents; for further details see [http://www.civicsandcitizenship.edu.au/cce/default.asp?id=
9221].
4 For example, see Dewey’s (2007) work on pedagogy and democratic cooperation, and
work on critical pedagogy (Freire, 2007), and Nussbaum (2006b) on Dewey and Tagore.
5 Other potential examples of goals being influenced by school curricula and ethos might be:
joining the army, religious affiliation and missionary activities, voting for a particular politi-
cal party, and choosing typically masculine, feminine or social class based subject choices.
In the UK there has been considerable public debate over whether ‘faith schools’, which
embody particular values, should be publically funded. McLaughlin, for example, argued
that raising a child within a faith means that they are more likely to achieve autonomy
on reaching adulthood, as such children are better enabled to make informed judgements.
Others argue that such schools risk indoctrination or coercion (Haydon, 2009).
6 Burchardt concludes that ‘influences that are systematically related to previous experience
of socio-economic inequality must surely fall into the category of being incompatible with
real freedom’ (2009, p. 15).
7 The focus of the project was pro-poor values as these were seen as consistent with the
expansion of the capabilities of the population as a whole.
8 For example, some students expressed frustration that their existing course content did not
help them to contribute to poverty reduction, which might suggest the existence of already
formed important values. This raises the question of whether individuals inherently have
differing ‘core’ values.
9 On this point, see also Sen’s (2006, p. 35) point that reasoning is central to leading a human
life.
10 The concept of ‘banking’ education has been most clearly articulated—and attacked—by
Freire (1970, 2007), whereby a student is viewed as an empty ‘account’ to be filled by
the teacher.
11 With regard to the balance of private benefits and public good from education, we note
that the recent changes to the UK university system are a particular cause for concern
here. Subjects that are perceived to support economic growth (such as science and tech-
nology) continue to be promoted while budgets for humanities subjects are reduced. More-
over, the current reforms are based on a conception of university education as a private
good. The system of tuition fees is encouraging students to choose degrees that will give
market-oriented skills and thus provide higher earnings. In this way, the reforms represent
a substantial move away from a conceptualization of a university education as a public
good.
12 See the debate about whether girls genuinely ‘choose’ subjects traditionally seen as
feminine and reject subjects traditionally dominated by boys, such as science and
mathematics.
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